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I. INTRODUCTION 
With mass murders on the rise, the public demanded legislative 
action to ameliorate the issue.  Thus far, the legislature’s response has been 
primarily comprised of gun reform proposals.1  Congress has been flooded 
with bills and acts that call for stricter licensing practices, more in-depth 
background checks, or bans on assault weapons and high capacity 
magazines.2  However, the solution to the mass murder problem does not 
likely lie within gun control, but rather, within prescription drug control.3  
Antidepressant and antipsychotic medications are known to increase suicidal, 
homicidal, and violent tendencies in some users.4  Individuals such as James 
E. Holmes, Seung-Hui Cho, and Eric Harris were prescribed antidepressant 
or antipsychotic medications.5  Afterward, these same individuals committed 
the mass murders at Aurora Century movie theater, Virginia Polytechnic 
                                                 
* Marissa Duquette will graduate from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard 
Broad Law Center, in May 2015.  Duquette would like to thank the board members and her 
colleagues at the Nova Law Review for persistently working to improve and refine this article.  
She would also like to thank Professors Rex Ford and Michael Richmond for their guidance 
and support, as well as her family—Scott, Marie, and Rosco—for all of their dedication and 
encouragement. 
1. See Jana R. McCreary, “Mentally Defective” Language in the Gun 
Control Act, 45 CONN. L. REV. 813, 831 (2013). 
2. See id. at 832; JEFFREY A. ROTH & CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, IMPACTS OF THE 1994 ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN:  1994–96 1 (1999). 
3. Jerome R. Corsi, Psych Meds Linked to 90% of School Shootings, WND 
(Dec. 18, 2012, 10:16 PM), http://www.wnd.com/2012/12/psych-meds-linked-to-90-of-
school-shootings/; Bob Unruh, Are Meds to Blame for Cho’s Rampage?, WND (Apr. 23, 
2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.WND.com/2007/04/41218. 
4. Corsi, supra note 3; Unruh, supra note 3. 
5. Corsi, supra note 3; see McCreary, supra note 1, at 823, 824 n.54. 
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Institute and State University, and Columbine High School, respectively.6  A 
simple analogy illustrates the point. 
A drunk driver swerves off of the road and onto a crowded sidewalk, 
killing some and injuring others.  Nobody blames the vehicle.  Legislators do 
not call for sports car bans.  The Department of Motor Vehicles is not 
criticized for its failure to perform a more thorough background check before 
issuing the driver’s license.  Rather, society blames alcohol and its ability to 
impair normal human functions. 
Contrastingly, a drug-addled college student storms onto campus and 
proceeds to slaughter thirty-two students with two semiautomatic handguns:  
A Walther P22 .22 caliber and a Glock 19 9-mm.7  A sizeable number of 
people blame the firearms.8  Legislators call for assault weapon bans and 
high capacity magazine bans.9  The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms (“ATF”) is criticized for its inability to establish an effective 
federal background check system.10  Very few people blame the college 
student’s prescription medication and its ability to induce suicidal, 
homicidal, and violent behavior.11 
This article proposes that the gun—like the car—should not be the 
subject of further regulation.12  Antidepressant and antipsychotic medications 
should bear the blame for their capacity to induce violent behavior in users.13  
As such, the pharmaceutical industry—not the gun industry—should be the 
legislature’s focus if the mass murder problem is to be solved.14 
This article begins with an overview of American gun control to 
date.15  It then analyzes the legislature’s failure to curb mass shootings 
through stricter gun laws.16  In doing so, the article negates two common 
misconceptions:  First, that gun control reduces the number of firearms in 
criminal hands; and second, that a European-style ban on firearms would be 
a possible and effective solution to the mass shooting problem.17  While 
                                                 
6. McCreary, supra note 1, at 823–24; Corsi, supra note 3. 
7. McCreary, supra note 1, at 824, 829; see also Corsi, supra note 3; Unruh, 
supra note 3. 
8. See Unruh, supra note 3. 
9. See ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 1. 
10. See Mark B. Melter, The Kids are Alright; It's the Grown-ups Who Scare 
Me:  A Comparative Look at Mass Shootings in the United States and Australia, 16 GONZAGA 
J. INT'L L. 33, 55–56 (2012). 
11. See Corsi, supra note 3. 
12. See infra Part IV. 
13. See infra Part IV. 
14. See infra Part IV. 
15. See infra Part II. 
16. See infra Part III. 
17. See infra Part III. 
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invalidating those false impressions, the article displays how increased gun 
availability actually lowers mass shooting rates.18  The article then discusses 
the link between mass shootings and prescription drug use and details how 
such violence can actually be a treatment-induced problem.19  Finally, the 
article closes with a new way for legislators to respond to the mass murder 
problem.20  This involves a shift in responsibility from the gun industry to the 
pharmaceutical industry by putting liability on the latter, and requiring drug 
compatibility tests to be administered prior to prescribing a medication.21 
II. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN GUN LEGISLATION 
Modern gun control debates in the United States are typically 
preceded by a tragic event; most often it is a mass shooting.22  However, 
prior to the 1900s, gun control laws were enacted in response to slave 
uprisings and were primarily aimed at keeping slaves and freedmen from 
obtaining firearms.23  In 1911, New York enacted the Sullivan Law as a 
response to the widely publicized shooting of novelist David Graham 
Phillips.24  The Sullivan Law required that a permit be obtained before an 
individual was allowed to possess or carry a handgun.25  This was among the 
first major forms of gun control outside of the South.26 
Prohibition in 1919 spurred alcohol smugglers and distillers to 
engage in turf wars with one another, culminating in the St. Valentine’s Day 
Massacre ten years later.27  Such extreme gun violence prompted legislators 
to pass the National Firearms Act (“NFA”), which targeted the gangs’ 
weapons of choice:  Machine guns and short-barreled shotguns.28  This Act 
did not expressly prohibit the possession of such arms, but it did make 
ownership of them financially infeasible.29  For example, the Thompson 
M1928 (“Tommy Gun”)—a notoriously popular gun for smugglers and 
                                                 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Part V. 
21. See infra Part V. 
22. McCreary, supra note 1, at 831; Corsi, supra note 3. 
23. David B. Kopel, The Great Gun Control War of the Twentieth Century—
and Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1527, 1529 (2012). 
24. Peter Duffy, 100 Years Ago, a Killing that Spurred a Gun Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, at A.21; Author Phillips Shot Six Times; May Recover, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
24, 1911), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F20911F93C5517738DDD
AD0A94D9405B818DF1D3. 
25. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1529. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 1531. 
28. See id. at 1531, 1533. 
29. See id. 
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gangsters—typically sold for around two hundred dollars in that time 
period.30  The NFA placed a two hundred dollar flat tax for possessing that 
gun, as well as any other machine gun or short-barreled shotgun.31  Hence, 
owning a Tommy Gun after the ratification of the NFA would cost four 
hundred dollars.32  Taking inflation into consideration, that is the equivalent 
of $5,386.29 today, thus making possession of such a weapon practically 
unachievable.33 
Shortly after the NFA, Congress passed the Federal Firearms Act of 
1938 (“FFA”).34  Under this Act, firearms dealers had to keep a record of all 
gun sales and obtain a license before they could acquire or ship any weapon 
over state lines.35  Additionally, the Act made it “unlawful for any person 
who [was] convicted of a [violent crime] ‘to receive any firearm or 
ammunition which had been shipped’” over state lines; as such, firearms 
dealers were responsible for ascertaining that any prospective buyer had not 
been previously convicted of a violent crime.36 
In 1939, the NFA and the FFA were discussed in detail by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Miller.37  In that case, 
two defendants were charged with violating the NFA and the FFA when they 
transported a sawed-off, double-barreled shotgun over state lines.38  In 
response, the defendants argued that the Acts violated their Second 
Amendment rights.39  Justice McReynolds, writing for the majority, found 
that the Second Amendment did not protect the individual right to possess a 
sawed-off double-barrel shotgun since it was not a common-use weapon and 
bore no relationship to the preservation of a well-regulated militia.40  
Although the Court tried to make it clear that the right to bear arms was an 
individual right rather than a collective or states’ right,41 the decision in 
                                                 
30. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI: A 
CENTENNIAL HISTORY, 19082008 16 (2008); see BILL YENNE, TOMMY GUN: HOW GENERAL 
THOMPSON’S SUBMACHINE GUN WROTE HISTORY 86 (2009). 
31. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1533. 
32. See YENNE, supra note 30, at 86; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1533. 
33. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
34. 15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1938) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012)); 
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1533–34. 
35. 15 U.S.C. § 902(f); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1534. 
36. 15 U.S.C. § 902; United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 263 (3d Cir. 1942), 
rev’d, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1534. 
37. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
38. Id. at 175. 
39. Id. at 176. 
40. Id. at 175, 178. 
41. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–80, 592 (2008). 
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Miller resulted in nationwide misinterpretation of the Second Amendment.42  
One example comes from Commonwealth v. Davis,43 in which the state’s 
supreme court said: 
[T]he declared right to keep and bear arms is that of the people, the 
aggregate of citizens; the right is related to the common defense; 
and that in turn points to service in a broadly based, organized 
militia. 
. . . . 
[The Second Amendment] is not directed to guaranteeing the 
rights of individuals, but rather, as we have said, to assuring some 
freedom of State forces from national interference.44 
From 1939 to 2008, courts across the United States erroneously used Miller 
to justify otherwise unconstitutional restrictions on Second Amendment 
rights.45 
In 1967, New York City mandated long-gun registration.46  
Eventually, the registry information was used to confiscate those firearms 
after the city council erroneously decided that rifles and shotguns were 
assault weapons.47  When federal legislators attempted to adopt New York 
City’s gun registration methods, the House of Representatives amended 
statutes to explicitly forbid federal agencies from compiling any information 
that could be used for a national gun registry.48 
The Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”) slightly altered the record-
keeping requirements set forth by the FFA.49  It required firearms dealers to 
record a buyer’s personal information and the gun’s identifying features such 
                                                 
42. Id. at 627 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 179); United States v. Warin, 530 
F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178); Stevens v. United States, 440 
F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 
261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), rev’d, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 174); 
Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Mass. 1976) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 177–
78); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1550. 
43. 343 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1976). 
44. Id. at 848–50. 
45. Warin, 530 F.2d at 106–07 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178); Stevens, 440 
F.2d at 149 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178); Tot, 131 F.2d at 266 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 
174); Davis, 343 N.E.2d at 850 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 177–78). 
46. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1541. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 1565–66. 
49. Id. at 1534, 1545.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(5) (2012), with 27 C.F.R. 
§ 478.11 (2014). 
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as its model and serial number on Form 4473 for each gun sale.50  Although 
Form 4473 is a federal form, the gun sale would be registered by the dealer 
and “would not be collected in a [national] registration list.”51  The pool of 
civilians who were legally allowed to purchase or possess a firearm from a 
licensed dealer was also the subject of GCA restrictions.52  Whereas the FFA 
only prohibited gun sales to individuals convicted of a violent crime, the 
GCA further prohibited gun and ammunition sales to illicit drug users and 
those who were mentally defective.53 
In the years following the enactment of the GCA, the phrase 
mentally defective was interpreted differently by courts across the United 
States.54  In 1973, the Eighth Circuit decided that a mental illness was not 
synonymous to a mental defect.55  Rather, the court determined that “[a] 
mental defective . . . is a person who has never possessed a normal degree of 
intellectual capacity, whereas . . . an insane person[’s] faculties which were 
originally normal have been impaired by [a] mental disease.”56  Therefore, in 
the Eighth Circuit, individuals with a subnormal level of intelligence were 
barred from owning guns, but individuals suffering from schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder, or a personality disorder were entitled to full Second 
Amendment rights.57 
In Huddleston v. United States,58 the Supreme Court attempted to 
improve the lower courts’ ability to analyze the language of the GCA’s 
prohibited persons categories.59  The Court stated that the ultimate goal of 
the GCA was to keep “‘lethal weapons out of the hands of criminals, drug 
addicts, mentally disordered persons, juveniles, and other persons whose 
possession of them is too high a price in danger to us all to allow.’”60  
Although this statement may have provided lower courts with the legislative 
                                                 
50. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1545; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(5). 
51. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1545–46. 
52. McCreary, supra note 1, at 816. 
53. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1546; McCreary, supra note 1, at 816.  Compare 
18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012), with 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2014). 
54. See United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 
1120, 1123–24 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Vertz, 102 F. Supp. 2d 787, 788 (W.D. Mich. 
2000). 
55. Hansel, 474 F.2d at 1124. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1125; McCreary, supra note 1, at 818 n.17, 844–45. 
58. 415 U.S. 814 (1974). 
59. Id. at 823, 825. 
60. Id. at 825. 
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intent behind the Act, it merely replaced the phrase mentally defective with 
mentally disordered, which did little to actually clarify the definition.61 
The ATF eventually revised its definition of the mentally defective 
class of individuals who were not allowed to possess a firearm.62  To belong 
to this class, an individual needed: 
(a) A determination by a court, board, commission, or other 
lawful authority that a person, as a result of marked subnormal 
intelligence, or mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease: 
(1) Is a danger to himself or to others; or 
(2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own 
affairs. 
(b) The term shall include— 
(1) A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal case; and 
(2) Those persons found incompetent to stand trial or found 
not guilty by reason of lack of mental responsibility . . . .63 
Correspondingly, there was no longer an issue as to whether mentally 
defective referred to mental illness or subnormal intelligence; the term 
encompassed both characteristics, and either one could disqualify an 
individual from firearm possession.64  However, courts faced a new problem:  
Whether commitment to a mental institution qualified as an adjudication of 
mental defectiveness.65 
In United States v. Giardina,66 the Fifth Circuit found that 
involuntary hospitalization would not disqualify an individual from the right 
to buy and possess a firearm under the statute.67  The court in United States 
v. Vertz68 went even further, finding that adjudication by a probate judge that 
a defendant required treatment because he was mentally ill was “not 
                                                 
61. McCreary, supra note 1, at 846 (noting that courts have been known to 
muddy the waters when it comes to interpreting the meaning of mentally defective).  Compare 
18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012), with Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 825. 
62. 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2014). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. See United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 47, 49 (1st Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Vertz, 102 F. 
Supp. 2d 787, 791 (W.D. Mich. 2000). 
66. 861 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1988). 
67. Id. at 1337. 
68. 102 F. Supp. 2d 787 (W.D. Mich. 2000). 
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sufficient to bring [the defendant] within the statute,” because “[t]he probate 
court made no finding that [the defendant] was a danger to himself.”69  
Finally, United States v. Rehlander70 established that full due process of law 
was required before any individual’s Second Amendment rights could be 
denied; as such, a voluntary commitment to a mental institution or a 
commitment for observation would not bar an individual from buying a 
firearm in the future.71  Although the ATF’s new definition was intended to 
clarify the Legislature’s intent in enacting the GCA—“keeping ‘[guns] out of 
the hands of . . . [those] whose possession of them is too high a price in 
danger’”—it seems as though it just shifted the courts’ focus further away 
from public safety concerns, and onto the Fifth Amendment rights of the 
mentally ill.72 
In 1986, Congress decided that “the rights of citizens to keep and 
bear arms under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution . . 
. require additional legislation to correct existing firearms statutes and 
enforcement policies.”73  Accordingly, the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act 
(“FOPA”) was made law that year.74  Originally, one of the major proposals 
of the Act would have banned most of the center-fire rifle ammunition in the 
United States, since Republican Mario Biaggi put forward a cop-killer bullet 
ban and over-broadly defined what that would include.75  Fortunately, the 
National Rifle Association made a compromise with Biaggi and modified the 
text of the Act to simply “ban[] a category of ammunition that was no longer 
being produced for the retail market.”76  In addition to banning certain types 
of ammunition, “FOPA . . . banned the sale of new machine guns . . . to the 
public,” placed restrictions on the ATF’s power, forbade federal gun 
registration, and required firearms dealers to report certain gun sales directly 
to the Attorney General.77  Specifically, FOPA required firearms dealers to 
provide a report to the Attorney General when any one purchaser bought two 
or more firearms within a five-day period.78 
Although the FFA, GCA, and FOPA all specified classes of the 
population that were ineligible to purchase a firearm, licensed firearms 
                                                 
69. Id. at 788. 
70. 666 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2012). 
71. Id. at 48–49. 
72. Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 825 (1974). 
73. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 1, 100 Stat. 449, 
449 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012)). 
74. Id. 
75. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1572. 
76. Id. at 1573. 
77. § 103, 100 Stat. at 455; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1574. 
78. § 103, 100 Stat. at 455. 
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dealers had no way of confirming a prospective buyer’s eligibility.79  
Purchasers simply had to certify in writing that they were not a member of a 
disqualified class—such as a convicted felon or adjudicated as mentally 
defective—and the licensed dealer had to trust that this information was 
true.80  Of course, ineligible individuals wishing to obtain a firearm were 
inclined to falsely certify their eligibility, so in 1993, Congress attempted to 
ameliorate this problem through the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act (“Brady Bill”).81 
The Brady Bill mandated a five-day waiting period before a licensed 
dealer could release a gun to a purchaser.82  In that five-day period, licensed 
dealers collaborated with the local chief law enforcement officers, who 
conducted a background check to verify the purchaser’s eligibility.83  Five 
years later, the waiting period requirement expired pursuant to the terms of 
the Brady Bill and was replaced with the National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System (“NICS”).84  The NICS, maintained by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), cut out the chief local law 
enforcement middleman and allowed firearms dealers themselves to conduct 
background checks on potential buyers.85  To accommodate a prospective 
gun buyer’s right to privacy, the NICS background check would only reveal 
the buyer’s eligibility status, and not the reason behind it; i.e., the system 
would only display ineligible rather than adjudicated as mentally defective.86  
Unfortunately, even this system had its glitches.87  State agencies with 
information related to a person belonging to a class of prohibited purchasers 
were under very little pressure to report this information to the FBI.88  
Consequently, compliance with reporting procedures was infrequent and the 
NICS was rarely up to date, resulting in a prospective purchaser’s 
ineligibility failing to show up on the NICS for months.89  In addition, “only 
‘licensed’ importers, manufacturers, and dealers [were] federally mandated 
                                                 
79. United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 263 (3d Cir. 1942), rev’d, 319 U.S. 
463 (1943); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1534, 1546; McCreary, supra note 1, at 833. 
80. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1546; McCreary, supra note 1, at 833–34. 
81. McCreary, supra note 1, at 834–35. 
82. Id. at 835. 
83. Id. 
84. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1582–83; Melter, supra note 10, at 55. 
85. Melter, supra note 10, at 55. 
86. See McCreary, supra note 1, at 854. 
87. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, STATE LAWS AND PUBLISHED ORDINANCES xiii–xv (31st ed. 2010–2011), available 
at https://www.atf.gov/files/publications/download/p/atf-p-5300-5-31st-editiion/2010-2011-
atf-book-final.pdf; McCreary, supra note 1, at 837–38; Melter, supra note 10, at 55. 
88. See McCreary, supra note 1, at 835–36. 
89. See id. at 838. 
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to perform background checks on weapons purchasers,” which meant that 
private firearms sales—including sales at gun shows—could be conducted 
legally without inquiry into a purchaser’s eligibility.90  Furthermore, 
concealed carry permits and similar firearms licenses qualified as alternatives 
to the background check requirements of the Brady Bill in nineteen states.91  
Although a background check is almost always required in order to obtain 
any sort of weapons permit, states had no federal obligation to keep permit 
record information on a readily accessible database for licensed firearms 
dealers to access.92 
The NICS Improvement Act recognized that there were problems 
with the Brady Bill’s background check requirement, but failed to correctly 
identify them.93  Rather than providing incentives for state agency reporting 
compliance, closing the gun show loophole, or eliminating the license 
alternative to a background check, it merely required federal agencies with 
any information regarding an individual’s ineligibility to “report that 
information to the Attorney General . . . quarterly.”94 
In 1994, the Clinton Crime Bill was enacted as a response to Patrick 
Purdy’s mass murder in Stockton, California, and the intensifying turf and 
drug wars conducted by gangs.95  It included one of the most irrational and 
functionally inconsequential assault weapon bans in the history of American 
gun control, ironically titled the Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use 
Protection Act.96  The ban outlawed a mere nineteen guns by name, some of 
which had already been banned since 1989.97  Of the nineteen explicitly-
banned guns in the Act, there were at least twelve legal substitutes already on 
the market.98  The Act also banned roughly two hundred more guns based on 
“appearances [and] . . . accessories such as bayonet lugs and adjustable 
stocks,” under what was called the Features Test.99 
(30) The term “semiautomatic assault weapon” means— 
. . . . 
                                                 
90. Melter, supra note 10, at 55–56. 
91. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, supra note 87, 
at xiv–xv. 
92. See id.; McCreary, supra note 1, at 835. 
93. See McCreary, supra note 1, at 837–38. 
94. See id. at 837. 
95. ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 1; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585. 
96. See ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 1; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585–86. 
97. ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 2–3; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585. 
98. ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 3. 
99. ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 4; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585–86. 
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(B) a semiautomatic rifle that has an ability to accept a 
detachable magazine and has at least [two] of— 
(i) a folding or telescoping stock; 
(ii) a pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously 
beneath the action of the weapon; 
(iii) a bayonet mount; 
(iv) a flash suppressor or threaded barrel 
designed to accommodate a flash suppressor; and 
(v) a grenade launcher . . . .100 
The Features Tests for semiautomatic pistols and shotguns were similarly 
focused on aesthetics.101  The overbroad and generic nature of the Features 
Test allowed firearms manufacturers to disconnect the frills, rename the 
weapons, and ultimately sell guns that were “operationally the same as the 
banned guns.”102  Moreover, roughly six hundred firearms, such as the Ruger 
Mini-14, were explicitly exempted from the ban because of their large 
ownership base even though they were “functionally identical to banned 
guns like the AR-15.”103 
The Act also banned the sale of high capacity magazines—defined 
as “ammunition-feeding devices designed to hold more than [ten] rounds”—
but did not outlaw possession or use of them.104  As such, this ban was futile 
as well because “when one considers many of the older model guns . . . such 
as the AR-15 (in production since the 1960s) . . . the world-wide inventory of 
ammunition magazines holding more than [ten] rounds was probably in the 
tens or even hundreds of millions.”105 
Paradoxically, the most notable effect of the assault weapons ban 
was the influx of so-called assault weapons into civilian hands.106  While the 
Act was being debated in Congress, the production of soon-to-be-banned 
guns such as the Colt AR-15, SWD M-10, and TEC-9 skyrocketed.107  In 
1994, 203,578 assault weapons were produced just before the ban became 
                                                 
100. Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, H.R. 4296, 
103d Cong. § 2(b)(30)(B) (1994). 
101. See id. § 2(b)(30)(C)–(D). 
102. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1586; see ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 4. 
103. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585–86. 
104. ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 2; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1586. 
105. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1586. 
106. See ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 4. 
107. Id. at 3–5. 
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law later that year.108  This is in stark contrast to the annual average 
production of 91,137 assault weapons from 1989 to 1993.109  Since the 
market became flooded with assault weapons and high capacity magazines 
just before the ban was enacted, the price of these commodities dropped 
significantly the next year.110  Prior to the ban, an AR-15-type rifle sold for 
anywhere between $825 and $1325; by the very next June, the price of the 
same rifle had fallen to about $660.111  Although the transfer of an assault 
weapon was prohibited after 1994, individuals who paid a high pre-ban price 
and then “watched as their investment depreciated after the ban took effect” 
were prone to sell the weapon at a discount price to an ineligible purchaser, 
and then report the gun as stolen to an insurance company in order to collect 
on the policy.112  In essence, the Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use 
Protection Act made assault weapons more available and less expensive to 
those who could not pass a NICS background check.113  Thankfully, the 
assault weapon ban expired in 2004.114 
The Supreme Court of the United States had a chance to discuss gun 
bans—albeit a little late—in the 2008 case, District of Columbia v. Heller.115  
The law at issue in the case “totally ban[ned] handgun possession in the 
home” and was struck down.116  In making its decision, the Court relied on 
the common use principle.117  The common use principle dictates that a 
“prohibition of an entire class of arms” is unconstitutional if that class of 
arms is “overwhelmingly chosen by American[s]” for a lawful use, such as 
self-defense or sporting.118  Justice Scalia poignantly stated: 
It is no answer to say . . . that it is permissible to ban the 
possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms 
(i.e., long guns) is allowed. . . . There are many reasons that a 
citizen may prefer a handgun for home defense:  It is easier to 
store in a location that is readily accessible in an emergency; it 
cannot easily be redirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is 
easier to use for those without the upper-body strength to lift and 
                                                 
108. Id. at 6. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 5. 
111. See ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 3, 5. 
112. Id. at 1, 45. 
113. See Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, H.R. 
4296, 103d Cong. § 2 (1994); ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 5; Melter, supra note 10, at 55–
56. 
114. H.R. 4296 § 6(2); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1604. 
115. 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008). 
116. Id. at 628, 635. 
117. Id. at 627; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1608; Melter, supra note 10, at 46. 
118. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627–28. 
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aim a long gun; it can be pointed at a burglar with one hand . . . .  
Whatever the reason, handguns are the most popular weapon 
chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete 
prohibition of their use is invalid.119 
Under this common use interpretation, a future ban on semiautomatic AR-
15s and the like would arguably be unconstitutional as well, because they are 
some of the most popularly owned guns in America.120 
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH GUN LEGISLATION 
Unfortunately, the GCA and FOPA were not enough to stop Laurie 
Dann from obtaining a firearm and shooting seven children in 1988.121  The 
Acts were insufficient to keep Patrick Purdy from killing five children and 
wounding thirty others in Stockton, California with a Kalashnikov-style 
semi-automatic rifle in 1989.122  The Public Safety and Recreational 
Firearms Use Protection Act did not keep Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold 
from obtaining a Savage-Springfield 67H, Hi-Point 995, TEC-9, or Stevens 
311D, all of which were used in 1999 to kill thirteen and wound twenty-four 
others at Columbine High School.123  The NICS did not reveal that Seung-
Hui Cho had been involuntarily committed to a mental institution, and was 
thus ineligible to buy the Walther P22 and Glock 19 that he used to kill 
thirty-two people at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University.124  These instances alone should indicate that gun control is not 
effectively reducing mass shootings, but they are only some of the most 
notable.125  As of 1976 under the GCA, until FOPA was enacted, there were 
190 mass shootings and 880 victims in America.126  In the time span between 
the enactment of FOPA and the Brady Bill, there were 140 mass shooting 
                                                 
119. Id. at 629. 
120. EDWARD W. HILL, MAXINE GOODMAN LEVIN COLL. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, 
CLEVELAND STATE UNIV. HOW MANY GUNS ARE IN THE UNITED STATES?  AMERICANS OWN 
BETWEEN 262 MILLION AND 310 MILLION FIREARMS 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.urban.csuohio.edu/publications/hill/GunsInTheUS_Hill_032813.pdf; Kopel, supra 
note 23, at 1608. 
121. See Unruh, supra note 3. 
122. See Kopel, supra note 23, at 1578; Unruh, supra note 3. 
123. Janet L. Kaminski Leduc, OLR Research Report: Weapons Used in Mass 
Shootings, ST. CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/rpt/2013-
R-0057.htm; Unruh, supra note 3. 
124. McCreary, supra note 1, at 824, 829–30; Kaminski Leduc, supra note 
123; Unruh, supra note 3. 
125. See Melter, supra note 10, at 41; Unruh, supra note 3. 
126. Melter, supra note 10, at 60. 
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incidents and 620 individuals either wounded or killed.127  During the era of 
the Clinton Crime Bill, 193 mass shootings occurred, leaving 875 people 
either dead or injured.128  Since 2004, when the assault weapons ban ended, 
there have been 178 mass shootings and 969 victims.129 
Still, about twenty-four percent of the nation’s citizens believe that 
tighter gun restrictions would prevent mass shootings in America.130  This is 
despite the fact that countries with even more stringent gun laws than the 
United States have had their fair share of mass shootings.131  England—with 
a mere 6.2 guns per one hundred people—experienced a mass shooting in 
2010, which claimed the lives of twelve citizens.132  Germany had “three of 
the five worst school shootings worldwide over the past fifteen years,” 
despite the country’s incredibly strict gun laws.133  But two instances hardly 
prove the point:  It could be argued that Europeans have only seen about 
twelve mass public shootings and just over one hundred people killed by 
gunfire, during those shootings, since 2001, which is notably less than what 
Americans have experienced in the same time frame.134  It is worthy of note, 
however, that although the number of mass shooting incidents in Europe is 
less than that in America, the number of mass murders is roughly the same; 
perpetrators simply resort to bombs and arson instead of firearms.135 
Even supposing that the prevalence of guns in the United States is to 
blame for mass shootings, gun bans have proved ineffective in the past and 
government seizures of firearms would be just as unsuccessful in reducing 
gun availability.136  There are between 262 and 310 million firearms 
privately owned in America.137  Guns are not registered or tracked, so there 
is no reliable way for the government to hunt down and seize each one.138  
Furthermore, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, gun owners would need to 
                                                 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 60–61; MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, ANALYSIS OF RECENT 
MASS SHOOTINGS 6–23 (2013), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/
NEWS/A_U.S.%20news/US-news-PDFs/Analysis_of_Mass_Shootings.pdf. 
130. Melter, supra note 10, at 42; Amy Roberts, By the Numbers:  Guns in 
America, CNN (Aug. 9, 2012, 1:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/09/politics/btn-guns-
in-america. 
131. Melter, supra note 10, at 42–43. 
132. Id. at 43. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 43–44, 60–61 tbl.1. 
135. See “Assault Weapons,” GUNCITE, http://www.guncite.com/gun_control_
gcassaul.html (last updated Oct. 24, 2010); see also Melter, supra note 10, at 42, 44, 60–61 
tbl.1. 
136. See Melter, supra note 10, at 46–47, 49–51. 
137. HILL, supra note 120, at 2. 
138. Id. 
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be adequately compensated if the government chose to confiscate their 
property.139  This would require “hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars,” 
which is simply not in national or states’ budgets.140  Hence, it is highly 
unlikely that gun owners would receive even half of the fair market value of 
their firearms, let alone a single penny for their ammunition and add-ons.141  
Even if government agencies were able to confiscate fifty percent of the guns 
in the United States—with adequate compensation to the owners—over 100 
million guns would still remain.142  Against those numbers, it is difficult to 
imagine that a potential mass shooter would have any trouble gaining access 
to a firearm.143  As such, a government seizure of guns in America would be 
operationally impossible, financially impracticable, constitutionally 
impermissible, and ultimately ineffective.144 
Contrary to popular belief, research shows that the overwhelming 
presence of firearms actually has a deterrent effect on mass shooters.145  As 
one author noted, “mass shootings rarely take place within the hunting aisles 
of Wal-Mart or at the local shooting range.”146  In fact, “mass shooter[s] 
[almost] always pick a location in which” law-abiding citizens will not be 
armed, such as a school or a place of worship.147  Conversely, areas where 
citizens can lawfully carry a concealed handgun are sixty-seven percent less 
likely to experience a mass-shooting incident.148  This is primarily because 
armed civilians are not suitable prey—they possess the ability to neutralize 
the shooter—and mass shooters are looking for a target, not a duel.149  In 
light of this, Americans may want to think twice before they blame mass 
shootings on the prevalence of firearms.150 
IV. THE LINK TO ANTIDEPRESSANT AND ANTIPSYCHOTIC USE 
Mass shooters have more in common than the fact that they all—by 
definition—used a firearm to effectuate death and injury.151  This has led 
                                                 
139. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1564. 
140. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1564. 
141. Id. at 1564–65. 
142. Melter, supra note 10, at 51. 
143. Id. 
144. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; HILL, supra note 120, at 2, 8 figs.4 & 5 
(noting the sheer number of households that contain a firearm); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1564; 
Melter, supra note 10, at 49–51. 
145. Melter, supra note 10, at 41–42. 
146. Id. at 53. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 42. 
149. See id. at 41. 
150. See Melter, supra note 10, at 41. 
151. See id. 
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authors and researchers to propose alternatives to gun control that could be 
used to arrive at an actual solution to the mass murder problem.152  For 
instance, most mass shooters have a documented history of mental illness.153  
Hence, numerous researchers have proposed that gun buyers should be 
required to provide firearms vendors with a certificate guaranteeing the 
buyer’s mental health.154 
While this seems like a viable solution to the mass shooter problem, 
it suffers from the exact same flaws as previous gun control legislation, but 
with more of a negative economic impact.155  Looking at the mental health 
certificate idea objectively, it is plain to see that it is just an additional form 
of permit or background check that gun purchasers would need to supply.156  
Firearms dealers would still have the burden of verifying the certificate’s 
authenticity, and states would still be under no obligation to keep records in a 
readily searchable database in order to facilitate verification; in fact, as seen 
with the NICS, states are sometimes reluctant to comply even when they are 
urged to supply records for a federal database.157  Prospective gun buyers 
without insurance might not be able to afford the doctor’s visit, and 
therefore, they would be denied their Second Amendment rights purely 
because of their economic status.158  If Medicare or Medicaid covered the 
cost of the doctor’s visit for those without adequate funds, then the already-
strained federal budget would be put under even more stress.159  
Furthermore, the mental health certificate may rely on the opinion of a single 
doctor, which may not always be accurate.160  Even if accurate, the practice 
of denying Second Amendment rights to those diagnosed as mentally ill 
would be constitutionally impermissible because those individuals would not 
have received due process of law before their rights were stripped.161  
Essentially, there are too many problems with the mental health certificate 
idea for it to be a viable solution.162 
                                                 
152. Id. at 56; McCreary, supra note 1, at 855. 
153. See Unruh, supra note 3. 
154. McCreary, supra note 1, at 855; Melter, supra note 10, at 56. 
155. See McCreary, supra note 1, at 855–57. 
156. Id. at 855. 
157. Id. at 838, 856. 
158. See U.S. CONST. amend. II; McCreary, supra note 1, at 838, 856. 
159. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND 
MEDICARE ON THE FEDERAL BUDGET 1 (2002), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/39xx/doc3982/11-14-longrangebrief6.pdf; McCreary, supra note 1, at 
857. 
160. See McCreary, supra note 1, at 827 (noting that Cho was released from a 
mental health facility after one doctor said that he was not a danger to himself or others). 
161. United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2012). 
162. E.g., McCreary, supra note 1, at 857. 
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Fortunately, the fact that many mass shooters had a documented 
mental illness means that they have yet another characteristic in common:  
Most of them sought—or were forced to undergo—treatment from a 
physician or psychiatrist.163  Similarly, the treatments offered to these mass 
shooters were comparable in the sense that they were all antidepressant or 
antipsychotic medications.164  For example:  Laurie Dann, on Anafranil and 
Lithium, opened fire on seven children in 1988, killing one;165 Patrick Purdy, 
prescribed Thorazine and Amitriptyline, killed five children and wounded 
thirty others with an AK-47 assault rifle in 1989;166 that same year, Joseph T. 
Wesbecker gunned down twenty of his coworkers just a month after he 
began taking Prozac;167 unnamed “‘prescription medications related to the 
treatment of psychological problems”’ were found in Seung-Hui Cho’s 
possession just after his shooting rampage at Virginia Tech left thirty-two 
dead;168 finally, James Eagan Holmes was prescribed sertraline—a generic 
form of Zoloft—and Clonazepam shortly before he began stockpiling 
firearms and ammunition for his 2012 massacre in Aurora, Colorado;169 and 
those are just to name a few.  Thus, this pattern is a factor that cannot be 
ignored when trying to solve the mass shooting problem in America.170 
The availability of antipsychotics and antidepressants has been 
steadily increasing since the 1950s, with more than twenty types being 
introduced to the market since then.171  The number of Americans on 
antidepressants has doubled every ten years since the 1970s, and today, 
roughly ten percent of Americans are prescribed at least one of these 
drugs.172  There are four popular types of antidepressants:  Tricyclics, 
                                                 
163. Id. at 825; Unruh, supra note 3; Jenny Deam, James Holmes’ Psychiatrist 
Warned He May Pose Threat, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/
04/nation/la-na-james-holmes-documents-20130405. 
164. See Corsi, supra note 3; Unruh, supra note 3. 
165. Unruh, supra note 3. 
166. Robert Reinhold, Killer Depicted as Loner Full of Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
20, 1989, at A.8; Unruh, supra note 3. 
167. Ronald Smothers, Disturbed Past of Killer of 7 Is Unraveled, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 16, 1989, at 1.10; Unruh, supra note 3. 
168. Corsi, supra note 3. 
169. McCreary, supra note 1, at 823; Deam, supra note 163. 
170. See Corsi, supra note 3.  Approximately “[ninety] percent of school 
shoot[ers]” were prescribed these drugs.  Id. 
171. Bruce L. Saltz et al., Recognizing and Managing Antipsychotic Drug 
Treatment Side Effects in the Elderly, 14 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 
14, 14 (Supp. 2 2004), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC487007/
pdf/i1523-5998-6-52-14.pdf. 
172. Unruh, supra note 3; William Weir, Hartford Firm’s Genetic Tests Help 
Identify Effective Antidepressants for Individual Patients, COURANT (Dec. 29, 2011), http://
articles.courant.com/2011-12-29/health/hc-hartford-hospital-depression-0102-20111229_1_
antidepressants-dna-analysis-genomas. 
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monoamine oxidase inhibitors (“MAOIs”), selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (“SSRIs”), and serotonin and norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors 
(“SNRIs”).173  Popular SSRI brand names include Prozac, Paxil, Celexa, and 
Zoloft, whereas popular SNRIs are marketed under names such as Effexor 
and Cymbalta.174  SSRIs and SNRIs are more popular than tricyclics and 
MAOIs because they are newer, and, in comparison, users may have a 
decreased risk of developing long-term involuntary movement disorders.175  
However, patients react to drugs differently and “no one-size-fits-all 
approach to medication exists.”176 
Doctors and patients have to conduct trial-and-error experiments 
with different psychoactive drugs and different dosages in order to 
“maximize relief while minimizing side effects.”177  This is because 
antipsychotics and the four most popular categories of antidepressants are 
metabolized in the human body by two enzymes:  Cytochromes P2D6 and 
P2C19 (“CYP2D6” and “CYP2C19”).178  The body’s production of these 
enzymes determines how an individual will react to psychoactive 
medications.179  Accordingly, if a patient’s body naturally produces high 
amounts of CYP2D6 or CYP2C19, then the patient will metabolize an 
antidepressant such as Prozac very quickly, the drug will only effect the 
patient minimally, and only for a short amount of time.180  Conversely, if a 
patient’s body does not produce enough of these enzymes, then a normal 
dose of the psychoactive drug will cause the active ingredient to build up in 
the patient’s system.181  Such an accumulation of the drug in the human body 
causes serious side effects.182 
                                                 
173. 117 AM. JUR. Trials § 1 (2010). 
174. Id. 
175. Id.; Jack J. Chen, Drug-Induced Movement Disorders:  A Primer, U.S. 
PHARMACIST (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/c/10205/?+=alzheimer’s
_and_dementia,neurology. 
176. Trials, supra note 173, § 1. 
177. Id. 
178. What is CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, 
CEPMED, https://cepmed.dnadirect.com/grc/patient-site/psychiatric-drug-response/index.html 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2014); see also Weir, supra note 172. 
179. See Sara Hoffman Jurand, Lawsuits Over Antidepressants Claim the Drug 
Is Worse than the Disease, TRIAL, Mar. 2003, at 14, 16–17; see also M.J. Kuhar & A.R. Joyce, 
Is the Onset of Psychoactive Drug Effects Compatible with a Protein-Synthesis Mechanism?, 
28 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 94, 94–95 (Supp. 2003), available at http://
www.nature.com/npp/journal/v28/n1s/pdf/1300140a.pdf; What is CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 
Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178. 
180. What is CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, 
supra note 178. 
181. Jurand, supra note 179, at 16–17. 
182. Id. 
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The side effects experienced by poor metabolizers can range 
anywhere from nausea and dizziness to aggression and violence.183  
Akathisia is a reported side effect of psychoactive drug use that is 
characterized by “a terrible inner sensation of agitation accompanied by a 
compulsion to move about.”184  Patients experiencing akathisia often 
“describe it as wanting to ‘jump out of their skin.’”185  This condition has 
been known to trigger violent behavior and drive patients to commit suicide 
and homicide.186 
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical manufacturers insist that akathisia is 
not a side effect at all:  “[P]atients taking [antidepressants and 
antipsychotics] suffer from clinical depression—and . . . depressed people 
can be suicidal.”187  However, doctors often prescribe these drugs for medical 
conditions other than depression, and with good reason.188  Zoloft alone has 
been approved by the FDA as suitable for treating panic disorder, pediatric 
OCD, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, and social anxiety disorder, to name 
a few.189  Patients who received psychoactive drugs as a treatment for 
ailments such as these, and showed no homicidal or suicidal behaviors prior 
to taking the medication, suddenly committed violent acts up to and 
including homicide.190  For example, Vicky Jo Hartman received Zoloft from 
a family doctor despite the fact that “[s]he was not diagnosed with—or even 
evaluated for—clinical depression, anxiety attacks, or any other 
psychological disorder.”191  After a short period of taking the medication as 
directed, Vicky shot her husband and then committed suicide.192  
Furthermore, in spite of the confident facade that pharmaceutical companies 
                                                 
183. John Alan Cohan, Psychiatric Ethics and Emerging Issues of 
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187. Stephanie Francis Cahill, Luvox Lawsuit: Columbine Survivor Claims 
Antidepressant Caused Gunman’s Actions, A.B.A. J. Sept. 13, 2001, available at Westlaw, 1 
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189. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Liability of Prescription Drug 
Manufacturer for Drug User’s Suicide or Attempted Suicide, 45 A.L.R. 6th 385, 402 (2009). 
190. See Estates of Tobin v. SmithKline Beecham Pharm., 164 F. Supp. 2d 
1278, 1280, 1283–84 (D. Wyo. 2001); Jurand, supra note 179, at 14; Corsi, supra note 3. 
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put up—that the disease is to blame, not the drug—Solvay Pharmaceuticals 
settled with Columbine victims after it was alleged that Luvox caused Eric 
Harris’s high school rampage in 1999.193  In another case, the manufacturer 
of Paxil was found liable in a wrongful death suit in excess of six million 
dollars after expert testimony revealed that some individuals experience 
severe reactions to SSRIs such as Paxil and Prozac, that the shooter was one 
such individual, and that his ingestion of Paxil caused his homicidal and 
suicidal behavior.194  Instances such as these are evidence that homicidal and 
suicidal tendencies are not always a symptom of a pre-existing mental 
illness, but are sometimes a treatment-induced problem.195 
Despite the increasingly clear connection between psychoactive drug 
use and akathisia-related side effects, it was not until 2006 that the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) even considered requiring the warning labels 
to include these risks.196  Still, the failure to adequately warn about suicidal 
and homicidal tendencies has been the main source of litigation against 
pharmaceutical companies in recent years.197  Much of this litigation has 
proved to be unsuccessful for the plaintiffs for a few reasons.198 
According to Comment k in Section 402A of the Second 
Restatement of Torts, there are some products—such as antidepressants and 
antipsychotics—that are unavoidably unsafe.199  Unavoidably unsafe 
products are those that have the potential to pose a serious risk to users even 
if the product is used as directed.200  Manufacturers of products that fall 
under the meaning of Comment k are generally exempted from strict liability 
in suits for injuries related to the use of the product.201  Manufacturers are 
able to put unavoidably unsafe products—such as psychoactive 
medications—on the market as long as the medication is not unreasonably 
dangerous.202  A product is only unreasonably dangerous when its benefits 
                                                 
193. Taylor v. Solvay Pharm. Inc., 223 F.R.D. 544, 549 (D. Colo. 2004); 
Cahill, supra note 187. 
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196. Trials, supra note 173, § 5. 
197. Id. §§ 1, 5; Cahill, supra note 187; Jurand, supra note 179, at 14. 
198. Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of 
Learned-Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R. 5TH 1, 26–27 (1998); Rosenhouse, supra note 189, 
at 396–97. 
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965); Trials, supra 
note 173, § 10. 
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k; Trials, supra note 173, 
§ 10. 
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k; Trials, supra note 173, 
§ 10. 
202. Trials, supra note 173, § 10. 
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fail to outweigh its risks.203  Since the medical utility of an antipsychotic or 
antidepressant is so great, pharmaceutical manufacturers are rarely held 
liable for putting an unavoidably unsafe product on the market.204  As such, 
they can usually only be held liable for injury resulting from use of their 
product when they failed to provide an adequate warning.205 
In order to be sufficient, the warning label on psychoactive drug 
packaging “must:  (1) indicate the scope of the danger, (2) communicate the 
extent or seriousness of the potential danger, (3) alert a reasonably prudent 
practitioner to the danger, and (4) be conveyed in a satisfactory manner.”206  
The third adequate warning requirement brings up a problem known as the 
learned-intermediary doctrine (“LID”).207 
The LID functions as a major obstacle to plaintiffs asserting a failure 
to warn claim against pharmaceutical manufacturers.208  Under the LID, a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer has no duty to warn a patient of possible side 
effects.209  Rather, the manufacturer is only obligated to warn the medical 
practitioners who will be prescribing the drug.210  The LID applies to claims 
in strict liability and negligence, and it is used to break the chain of causation 
between the pharmaceutical manufacturer and the drug-induced violence of 
the patient.211  The rationale behind the LID is that the “physician is in the 
best position to evaluate the often complex information provided by the 
manufacturer concerning the risks and benefits of its drug . . . and to make an 
individualized medical judgment, based on the patient’s particular needs and 
susceptibilities, as to whether the patient should use the product.”212  In order 
to prove that a drug was not accompanied by a sufficient warning, a doctor, 
qualified as an expert, must testify that had a stronger warning been given, he 
would not have prescribed the drug to his patient.213  This requirement 
almost always sets the plaintiff up for failure, and the reason why is clear 
when one considers the abovementioned information about CYP2D6 and 
CYP2C19.214  Under the current scheme, doctors do not test a patient’s rate 
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206. Kane, supra note 198, at 29. 
207. Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 397. 
208. Kane, supra note 198, at 26; Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 397. 
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210. Kane, supra note 198, at 27; Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 397. 
211. Rosenhouse, supra note 189, at 397. 
212. Kane, supra note 198, at 26. 
213. Id. at 30–31. 
214. See Trials, supra note 173, § 16; Jurand, supra note 179, at 16–18; Kuhar 
& Joyce, supra note 179, at 94–95; Weir, supra note 172; What is CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 
Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, supra note 178. 
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of enzyme production prior to prescribing an antipsychotic or 
antidepressant.215  They operate under the assumption that every patient’s 
body has a normal level of CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 and will thus be capable 
of metabolizing the drugs properly.216  Since violent akathisia-related side 
effects do not occur when a drug is metabolized properly, doctors are 
justified in prescribing a medication—regardless of the known possible side 
effects—because a patient with normal CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 levels is 
statistically unlikely to suffer them.217  As such, physicians typically cannot 
testify that a stronger warning would have deterred them from prescribing a 
drug to a particular patient because it is not the content of the warning that 
has the most effect on their decision, but the probability that the warning’s 
content will occur.218 
If a doctor is capable of providing the necessary testimony in a 
failure to warn claim, the plaintiff’s next major obstacle is the 
pharmaceutical company’s federal preemption defense.219  Since the failure 
to warn is a state law cause of action, pharmaceutical companies are inclined 
to argue that “the federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive as to leave no 
room for supplementary state regulation, or state law conflicts with federal 
law, making compliance with both either impossible or frustrating to the 
purpose of the federal law.”220  In cases such as these, the pharmaceutical 
companies insist that the FDA regulations create “both a floor and a ceiling 
for drug labeling” requirements.221  Under this theory, which was the 
common understanding of FDA regulations until 2008, pharmaceutical 
companies were discouraged from strengthening their warnings above what 
was required for FDA compliance.222  This was intended to reduce the risk of 
over-warning, because over-warning would “exaggerate [the drug’s] risk[] . . 
. to avoid liability,” which could “discourage [the] appropriate use of a 
beneficial drug” or “cause meaningful risk information to lose its 
significance.”223 
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However, some courts have noted that the federal regulations 
imposed by the FDA do not always preempt a state law cause of action 
against pharmaceutical manufacturers.224  One such case was Tucker v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp.,225 which involved a wrongful death claim 
against the manufacturer of the antidepressant Paxil.226  In that case, the court 
analyzed the language of the federal statutes that govern changes to a 
psychoactive drug’s warning label.227  The court noted that “the FDA 
regulations allow a manufacturer to modify pharmaceutical labels 
unilaterally and immediately, without prior FDA approval, when the 
manufacturer has reasonable evidence of a serious hazard.”228 
[T]he ongoing ability, authority, and responsibility to strengthen a 
label still rest squarely with the drug manufacturer. . . . [T]he 
FDA’s power to disapprove does not make the manufacturer’s 
voluntarily strengthened label a violation of federal law, which is 
what it would take to establish an actual conflict between state tort 
law and federal law.229 
Many cases after Tucker have followed a similar line of reasoning, finding 
that a pharmaceutical manufacturer has the duty to revise its warning label as 
soon as a possible risk is brought to light.230  Rather, the manufacturer’s duty 
to warn is dependent on the risks that it has reason to know about, and it is 
under a continuous obligation to notify prescribing physicians of any 
possible side effects that could possibly be related to the drug’s use.231  A 
causal relationship between the drug’s use and the purported risk does not 
need to be established in order for the duty to warn to apply.232 
Although a causal relationship need not be shown in order for the 
manufacturer to have the duty to warn, causation is a key element that 
plaintiffs need to prove at trial.233  The causation element is another large 
problem in failure to warn cases, because it requires the plaintiff to show that 
the suicide, homicide, or other event would not have occurred if the patient 
was not prescribed the medication.234  Since pharmaceutical manufacturers 
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are typically the only party with access to information about a drug’s ability 
to actually cause suicidal and homicidal behavior in patients, the plaintiff 
often has trouble establishing the required showing of causation.235 
V. THE SOLUTION 
In recent years, biomedical companies have been investing in 
pharmacogenetic studies, the results of which “offer[] the promise of 
‘personalized medicine.’”236  Pharmacogenetics is the study of differences in 
drug metabolism and response due to differing levels of enzyme 
production.237  Pharmacogeneticists recognize that some individuals are 
chemically incompatible with—or poor metabolizers of—certain prescription 
drugs.238  As a result, pharmacogeneticists have developed a simple test, 
which allows a physician to determine the CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 levels in 
a patient’s body.239  This compatibility test begins with a cheek swab, and 
after two days, a prescribing doctor is able to tell whether a patient will 
experience adverse side effects if prescribed a certain type of medication.240  
According to pharmacogenetic researchers, “[t]he solution . . . is to assess 
enzyme activity and then prescribe medication compatible with that . . . 
activity.”241  Accordingly, the compatibility test is intended to ensure that 
individuals suffering from psychosis, depression, anxiety, or other 
psychological disease will receive a medication that will work with their 
body chemistry.242  Administering the test to patients prior to prescribing an 
antipsychotic or antidepressant will reduce the likelihood that a patient will 
experience violent, homicidal, and suicidal side effects.243 
The proposal, then, is to require pharmaceutical companies to 
provide physicians and psychiatrists with the means necessary to conduct 
one of these tests for each patient who may need a psychoactive medication.  
If less people suffer from akathisia-related side effects, then there is a 
decreased likelihood that individuals will engage in mass shootings.244 
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The financial burden of providing the compatibility tests should not 
fall squarely on the doctors or medical facilities for a few reasons.  First, 
medical facilities such as hospitals, doctors’ offices, mental institutions, and 
psychiatrists’ offices are under a huge financial burden as it is.245  Their 
budgets should not be put under additional stress, especially because 
requiring them to foot the bill for the compatibility test could have a negative 
impact on patient treatment:  If the medical institution is required to foot the 
bill for the compatibility test, then doctors may be convinced to avoid 
prescribing psychoactive drugs in order to save the facility money.  This 
would be an undesired effect, as it may result in patients not receiving the 
treatment they need.  Putting the cost of providing the test on the prescribing 
physician or the medical facility could also cause doctors to continue 
prescribing psychoactive drugs, but simply not administer the test in an effort 
to save money.  If akathisia-related side effects in the patient occurred 
thereafter, then the doctor could lose his or her license and be held civilly 
liable to the patient.246  This would be yet another undesired effect.  Instead, 
putting the cost of the compatibility tests on the pharmaceutical 
manufacturers easily avoids these issues. 
Second, it is a standard principle of tort law that the duty to warn 
falls on the party with the most information available about the product, 
which is the manufacturer.247  The compatibility test is no more than a tool 
that establishes a personalized warning for each patient by providing the 
statistical likelihood of adverse side effects on the user.248  Therefore, the 
duty of providing the test or warning should fall on the manufacturer.249  
Third, this proposal complies with FDA regulations regarding manufacturer-
supplied warnings, because there is no federal law explicitly prohibiting 
pharmaceutical companies from providing the statistical likelihood that an 
individual patient will experience side effects.250 
Finally, this proposal serves as a way around the often-troubling 
LID:  If pharmaceutical companies were required to provide compatibility 
tests to medical practitioners in order to satisfy the adequate warning 
requirement and they failed to do so, then doctors could testify that they 
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would not have prescribed the drug if they knew that the patient was a poor 
metabolizer.  Currently, doctors, patients, and shooting victims bear the risk 
of loss for injury when akathisia-related side effects occur.251  This proposal 
places the risk of loss onto pharmaceutical manufacturers instead because 
they are in a better position to financially handle “the loss by distributing it 
as a cost of doing business.”252  Ultimately, this proposal opens the door for 
pharmaceutical company liability. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Mass shootings in America are not going to be stopped by simple 
gun regulations.253  The failures of previous gun laws and the sheer number 
of mass shootings that occurred during America’s strictest gun control eras 
should testify to that point.254  Government-sponsored gun buy-backs, future 
gun bans, and mental health certificates are not viable solutions either 
because of their inherent unconstitutionality and impracticability.255  When it 
comes to mass shootings, gun restrictions are analogous to treating a 
symptom; it is never going to cure the disease because it does not target the 
root cause.256  Instead, if Americans wish to find a solution to the mass-
shooting problem, they need to focus on targeting the source of mass 
shooters’ suicidal and homicidal proclivities.257  One such source is akathisia 
as a result of psychoactive drug use.258  Accordingly, the best way to reduce 
the likelihood of mass shootings is to reduce the likelihood that patients will 
suffer from akathisia after taking a prescription medication.259  One way to 
help ensure that this side effect will not occur is by conducting a simple 
compatibility test to determine the patients’ ability to metabolize 
psychoactive drugs.260  The compatibility test requirement also makes the 
pharmaceutical companies vulnerable to civil suit.261 
The doors for pharmaceutical company liability need to be opened 
when it is discovered that a mass shooter was using that company’s drug, and 
rightly so.  If it is discovered that an antipsychotic or antidepressant was 
being used by a mass shooter at the time of the massacre in question, then 
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pharmaceutical companies should bear some risk of liability.  This will 
undoubtedly help the survivors and the families of the deceased.  Typically, 
these individuals cannot recover from the shooter because he is either dead—
shot by the police or committed suicide at the scene—or because he is not 
financially capable of adequately compensating his victims.  The victims 
cannot recover from gun manufacturers under the current regulatory scheme 
because they are immune from suit in these circumstances.262  Survivors and 
the families of the deceased cannot recover from the owner of the shooting’s 
location because they would have to prove that the owner knew or should 
have known that this venue would be the place of an attack and he failed to 
hire security accordingly, which oftentimes requires a previous, similar 
violent instance at that location.263  Opening liability on the pharmaceutical 
companies gives the victims a chance to recover damages, have their medical 
expenses covered, or have their loved ones’ funeral service paid for.  It will 
also help because it will encourage the pharmaceutical companies to 
independently—on their own time and dime—work toward reducing the 
likelihood of their product causing a violent event. 
Aside from lifting the burden off of the gun industry, saving money 
on ineffectual gun legislation attempts, helping to reduce the mass shooting 
problem, and assisting victims in their struggle to recover, this solution also 
secures the rights of those suffering from mental illness.  With the 
compatibility test administered, these individuals do not have to suffer 
through a trial-and-error method of treatment; it is likely that they will get 
the most effective medication for their ailment the very first try—the best 
possible treatment for their illness—thus securing their right to 
comprehensive mental health care.  Further, this solution will assist in 
securing the Second Amendment rights of all American citizens—regardless 
of their health—because it does not impose additional disqualifiers for 
firearm ownership, nor does it mandate additional certifications or checks. 
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